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China’s sustained modernization effort across the branches of the PLA over the past 25 
years has produced several innovations.  Among them, in 2008, the U.S. Office of the 
Secretary Defense (OSD) in its annual report to Congress on China’s military power 
mentioned for the first time a new Chinese military concept called the “three warfares.” 
However, this and subsequent reports have offered little elaboration of the meaning and 
substance of the term.  This thesis seeks to fill a gap in existing literature on this aspect of 
PLA modernization by offering a more comprehensive understanding and explanation of 
the “three warfares,” its origins, and its intended aims as a complement to PLA war 
fighting doctrine.  It argues three points. First, the foundation of the PLA “three 
warfares” concept has roots in certain aspects of both Chinese and Western strategic 
thought.  Second, the PLA desire to develop its “three warfares” concept is strongly 
influenced by Western views on information in war in general and by U.S. information 
operations doctrine and experiences in particular.  And finally, the PLA sees its “three 
warfares” both as a complement to its warfighting capabilities and also as a militarized 
soft power component within a larger Chinese national strategy. 
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China’s sustained modernization efforts across the branches of the PLA have been 
significant. Beyond simply the protection of its homeland and the preservation of its 
sovereign interests, the PRC is at a point where it is now setting its sights on becoming a 
regional power with commensurate full spectrum military capabilities.1  
In 2008, the U.S. Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD) in its annual report to 
Congress on China’s military power mentioned for the first time what it considered to be 
a new and emerging Chinese military concept called the “three warfares” or san zhong 
zhanfa (三种战法).2  However, the report offered little in terms of elaborate explanation 
and substance on the subject, simply stating that media, legal, and psychological warfares 
“are being developed for use in conjunction with other military and non-military 
operations.”3   
Subsequent OSD reports for years 2009 and 2010 have continued to briefly 
mention this emerging Chinese warfighting idea but, much like the 2008 version, with a 
frustrating paucity of detail.4  Additionally, many non-U.S. sources that discuss the “three 
warfares” are equally as vague in their descriptions.  Overall, it would seem that the 
“three warfares” as a topic has not been adequately explored in Western literature.  For 
those interested in gaining a better understanding of this particular aspect of China’s 
military modernization some very basic yet important questions remain unanswered.   
                                                 
1 Full-spectrum is best defined as having military capabilities that span the areas of offensive, 
defensive, stability, and support operations as outlined in U.S. Army FM 3-0 Operations. 
2  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, [2008]), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf (accessed Nov. 2010). 
3  Ibid. 
4  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, [2009]), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf (accessed June 2010).; Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, [2010]), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf (accessed Nov. 2010). 
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For example, what constitutes and defines the “three warfares?”  What are its 
origins, and what, if any, are the traditional and theoretical foundations that support such 
a concept?  Further, why does the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) consider the 
development of a “three warfares” capability beneficial?  These are the questions that this 
thesis attempts to answer. 
First, the foundation of the PLA “three warfares” concept has roots in certain 
aspects of both Chinese and Western strategic thought and tradition.  Second, the PLA 
desire to develop its “three warfares” concept is informed and strongly influenced by 
Western views on the importance of information in war in general and by U.S. 
information operations doctrine and experiences in particular.  And finally, the PLA sees 
utility in achieving its “three warfares” aims both as a complement to its warfighting 
capabilities and also as a militarized soft power component within a larger Chinese 
national strategy. 
This thesis seeks to fill a gap in existing literature on this particular aspect of PLA 
modernization by offering a more comprehensive understanding and explanation of the 
“three warfares,” its origins, and its intended aims as a complement to PLA war fighting 
doctrine. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
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II. ORIGINS AND CHARACTERIZATIONS 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) mentioned the “three warfares” for the 
first time in the 2003 “Notification Regarding Distribution of ‘Regulations on Political 
Work in the People's Liberation Army’ by the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China.”5  In this official pronouncement, the responsibility for “wartime political 
work” was given to the General Political Department (GPD), assigning it the task of 
“conducting public opinion [media] warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.”6 
The GPD, or zongzhengzhi bu, is one of the four general headquarters 
departments under the Central Military Commission (CMC) and is responsible for all 
political and ideological activities within the PLA.  Aspects such as “morale building 
(often referred to as cultural affairs) and propaganda (publicity) functions,” which include 
media such as “newspapers, magazines, television, film, and the Internet,” are central to 
the mission of the GPD.7  The GPD is “also responsible for personnel matters, including 
party discipline, internal security, legal affairs, management of dossiers, and 
promotions.”8  In carrying out these political and ideological activities, political 
commissars work in party committees within all PLA units “to help guide ideological 
training and participate in collective or consensus decision making [as well as being] 
active in all aspects of military training [and] political training.”9  Any orders or guidance 
at the national level “are passed down the chain of command through a series of party 
committee meetings extending from Beijing to the grass-roots unit level [after which 
subordinate PLA] unit leaders hold training session with all soldiers to ensure 
understanding and compliance.”10 
                                                 
5  Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Regulations on Political Work in the People's 
Liberation Army," Chapter 1, Article 1 – Chapter 10, Article 106. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 28–29, 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0808/2007310490-d.html. 
8  Ibid., 29. 
9  Ibid., 29. 
10 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 29. 
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In the 2003 order noted above, the GPD was directed by the CMC to study the 
“methods and means of using modern science and technology to improve political work 
[along with] studying the legal and regulatory systems and policies for establishing 
political work.”11  All of the activities and goals outlined in this 2003 announcement 
apply to the “principal political departments of the General Staff Department, subordinate 
work departments of the General Political Department, political departments of the 
General Logistical Department, and political departments of the General Armament 
Department.”12 Further, regional level sub-departments were given the task of guiding 
wartime political work by “utilizing the combat function of political work.”13  
PLA group army and components at division level and below (e.g., regiment, 
brigade, battalion, company) have been apparently given perhaps a more narrow focus 
that emphasizes psychological warfare while leaving out the media and legal 
components.  Essentially, lower tactical level PLA elements have been directed to meet 
with “related departments to organize and launch psychological warfare” that could 
“disintegrate the enemy military” suggesting perhaps that the “three warfares” concept as 
a whole is more strategically focused.14    
As mentioned above, OSD has included the “three warfares” in its 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 reports on the Chinese military. However, the 2010 report, while short on 
detail, does offer what is perhaps the most authoritative and objective definition of “three 
warfares” by external observers. In particular, it states that “the concept of the ‘three 
warfares’ is being developed for use in conjunction with other military and non-military 
operations”15 Media warfare “is [being] aimed at influencing domestic and international 
public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and 
to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s 
                                                 
11  "Regulations on Political Work in the People's Liberation Army," Public Law 15, (2003): Chapter 
1, Article 1. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2010, 26. 
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5 
interests.16  Psychological warfare seeks “to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct 
combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and 
demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.”17  And legal 
warfare intends to use “international and domestic laws to gain international support and 
manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions.”18   
On the surface, the media and psychological warfare components seem clear.  But 
the 2010 OSD report includes more detail in describing legal warfare.  For example: 
China has incorporated the concept of Legal Warfare into its attempts to 
shape international opinion and interpretation of international law.  [For 
example,] an overwhelming majority of nations throughout the world, 
including the United States, believe that customary international law, as 
reflected in the [United Nations] Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), effectively balances the resource-related sovereign rights of 
littoral states, in their EEZ with the freedoms of navigation and overflight 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea of other nations.  This 
majority view is based upon a sound reading of the negotiating history of 
UNCLOS, the actual test of UNCLOS itself, and decades of state practice.  
The PRC, however, appears to be making concerted efforts, through 
enacting domestic legislation inconsistent with international law, 
misreading the negotiations and text of UNCLOS, and overlooking 
decades of state practice in attempts to justify a minority interpretation 
providing greater authority by littoral states over activities within the 
EEZ.19 
 
In 2004, the PLA published its Analysis of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare.20   Each 
case is described in detail, an analysis is given, and a “moral” is offered to the reader.  
For example, Case 3—”War Waged By A State to Check Secession”—discusses the 
Russian government’s first and second Chechen conflicts in the 1990s.  Analysis of these 
cases points out and emphasizes the importance of the Kremlin’s efforts in “restoring the 
                                                 
16 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2010, 26. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Wensheng Cong, ed., Anlysis of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare [Faluzhan Yibaili Jingdian Anli 
Pingxi], trans. Open Source Center (40 Dianmen Avenue West, Beijing, Postal Cose: 100035: PLA 
Publishing House, 2004), www.opensource.gov (accessed Jan. 2011). 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
 
 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
 
6 
legal system and constitutional order in accordance with the Russian federal laws and 
ordinances” so that legal justification for anti-terror combat operations could be 
eventually achieved.21  This PLA legal warfare guide concludes its analysis of this 
particular case by pointing out that regarding separatists “one must show no mercy” and 
that “legitimate and legal grounds are necessary to make sure that military operations are 
justified.”22  Lastly, the PLA legal guide suggests that “intensifying and perfecting 
domestic legislation provides strong domestic legal support for the operation to crack 
down on the separatist forces.”23  This case in particular no doubt resonates within the 
PLA and was most likely chosen by the PLA authors due to its similarity vis-à-vis 
potential separatist actions by Taiwan. 
Neighboring nations have similarly offered their own general and somewhat 
vague descriptions of “three warfares”.  For example, a recent Japanese government 
assessment has stated that the PLA “three warfares” appear “to emphasize not only 
physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, 
incorporating the concept of ‘three warfares’…into the tasks of the political work by [its] 
military, and declaring a policy of close coordination between military struggle and 
political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors.”24 
Some in Taiwan claim that the PLA has broken media warfare in particular down 
to six methods—”[seizing] initiatives, concentration, target critical weaknesses, 
penetrating, follow the situation to create favourable [sic] conditions, and confront enemy 
propaganda attacks.”25   These Taiwanese analysts state that psychological warfare aims 
to “weaken opposition psychology,” deter the enemy’s will, use emotion, deceive, 
“divide-and-rule, and conduct special operations.”26  And finally, the PLA intends for 
                                                 
21 Wensheng Cong, ed., Analysis of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2010 (Tentative Translation) (Tokyo: Ministry of 
Defense of Japan,[2010]), https://www.opensource.gov (accessed 2010). 
25  Chi Le-i, Taiwan Book Summary: Examination of Crisis in Strait 'Under New Situations' (Taipei, 
Taiwan: Li-ming Publishing,[2008]), https://www.opensource.gov. 
26  Ibid. 
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7 
legal warfare to consist of “legal deterrence, legal attack, legal counter-attack, legal 
constraint, legal sanction, and legal protection.”27 
These descriptions, when taken together, do afford a general understanding as to 
what the “three warfares” consist of.  However, many of these available sources offer 
definitions or descriptions of the “three warfares” that are quite simple, less than 
insightful, and fall short of providing any real substance or rationale for such an idea. 
That said there is certainly more to understand about this concept, especially those 
aspects of both Chinese and Western strategic thought and tradition that serve to underlie 
and provide rationale for including such an approach. 
                                                 
27 Chi Le-i, Taiwan Book Summary: Examination of Crisis in Strait 'Under New Situations.' 
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9 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
RATIONALE 
China’s strategic traditions, like those of other cultures, have roots in its 
respective history and culture.28   According to Alistair Iain Johnson, “…within the China 
field [of security studies] there seems to be little controversy about the proposition that 
‘deep’ history and culture are critical sources of strategic behavior [and choice].”29 
Chinese strategic culture has its roots “in early formative military thought and practice,” 
which affect how PLA strategists perceive their strategic environment and how they 
respond to that environment.30 
Take for example a key characteristic of Chinese strategic culture that places an 
“apparently low estimation of the efficacy of violence, as embodied for instance in Sun 
Zi’s oft-cited phrase, ‘not fighting and subduing the enemy is the supreme level of 
skill.’”31 Given the aforementioned definitions and general descriptions, the “three 
warfares” seems consistent with this general idea by seeking to utilize non-lethal or non-
kinetic methods to achieve a strategic goal.   
But more importantly, if Chinese history serves as an influential source for 
strategic behavior and development, it is helpful to consider certain important periods in 
ancient Chinese statecraft and how they relate to Chinese views regarding the current and 
future security environments. The Warring States period (463–221 BCE) is an especially 
important historical example and is particularly relevant in that it has provided Chinese 
strategists with what they consider to be two important lessons:  how to become a 
hegemon and how to survive destruction at the hands of one.32   
                                                 
28  Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3. 
29  Ibid., 22. 
30  Ibid., 25. 
31  Ibid., 25. 
32  Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press: For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., 2000), xxxv. 
bury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press: For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., 2000), xxxv. 
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During this period, the Qin state and its inhabitants were considered “the 
guardians of the frontier” with warfare being their primary occupation.33 While the Qin 
was viewed by many of its neighboring states as being “too small, weak, and remote” to 
pose a serious threat to them, it was acknowledged that Qin military and political officials 
were also “masters of strategy and tactics, using diplomacy, espionage, propaganda, and 
treachery adroitly.”34  As the Warring States period ended, the Qin state emerged the 
victor in what was a multipolar competition for power.  
Quite like the Warring States period, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leadership “throughout its history has relied on intellectuals and ideologues to rationalize 
the quirks of its decision making.”35  These individuals have provided analysis and 
advice to CCP officials quite like strategists did during the Warring States era.36  And in 
the minds of many of these modern Chinese intellectuals, the Warring States era is quite 
analogous to the world in which the PRC found itself after the fall of the Soviet Union.37   
Specifically, this view holds that without two competing superpowers, a powerful 
unchecked U.S. hegemon would most likely seek to build coalitions that could possibly 
contain and restrict China’s growth and interests.  After the Soviet collapse, He Xin, a 
“well connected” and influential Chinese academic proposed that China now found itself 
in an environment that was “amazingly” similar to the Warring States period.38   Within 
the PLA itself, Chinese General Gao Rui, a former vice president of the Academy of 
Military Science, has proposed that the Warring States era “shines with the glory of 
truth,” illustrating a “splendid military legacy” for China.39 
                                                 
33  Rhoads Murphey, East Asia: A New History (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1997), 
54. 
34  Ibid., 54. 
35  H. Xin and G. Barme, "A Word of Advice to the Politburo," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 
no. 23 (1990), 50. 
36  Ibid., 50. 
37  Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, 382. 
38  Xin and Barme, A Word of Advice to the Politburo, 60.Pillsbury, China Debates the Future 
Security Environment, xliii, xxxvi. 
39  Ibid., xxxvi. 
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11 
The Qin state in particular serves as a positive example for those Chinese 
strategists that acknowledge PRC weakness vis-à-vis the United States in general, and 
PLA weakness in particular.  If so, the Qin then serves as a likely early inspiration and 
justification for “three warfares” as a component to PLA warfighting given that the Qin 
were especially “adept at psychological warfare and at keeping their enemies guessing, 
frequently breaking agreements, shifting sides, and suddenly mounting lightning attacks 
without warning—often after disarming their opponents or weakening their morale 
through propaganda.”40  Ultimately, a Qin state that was considered to be a weaker power 
when compared to its rivals in quantitative terms was able to “win out in a troubled age 
of contention” because of the successful employment of skills like these.41  
Writing about Chinese strategy, Michael Pillsbury stated “the Chinese approach 
to deterrence and crisis management—as evidenced by their classical writings—has been 
to keep the adversary off balance and attempt to influence its perceptions in order to 
deter.”42  These ancient lessons “provide the PLA with a military heritage that is 
imprinted on soldiers before they enter the service through their social roots and then 
throughout their professional military education experience.”43 
Another important influence on Chinese strategic thought that emerged from the 
Warring States era was the writings of Sun Zi.44  Works like The Art of War, set down 
during this period, apparently remain an integral part of PLA professional military 
education.  Additionally, many of Sun Zi’s stratagems emphasize deception as in 
important part of any effective strategy.45  Before attempting to completely destroy an 
enemy, “Sun Zi stresses the use of deception” by stating “all warfare is based on 
deception.”46  This type of approach apparently advocated by Sun Zi emphasizes the need 
                                                 
40  Murphey, East Asia: A New History, 54. 
41  Ibid., 54. 
42  Michael Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," Foreign Policy, no. 41 (1980), 53. 
43  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 92. 
44  Sun Zi, Ralph D. Sawyer and Mei-Chün Sawyer, The Art of War [Sunzi bing fa.] (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 375. 
45  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 92. 
46  Sun Zi, Sawyer and Sawyer, The Art of War, 168.; Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition 
and Transformation for the 21st Century, 93. 
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to manipulate information that may distort an enemy’s perceptions.47   This also supports 
a “three warfares” capability in general and perception management and psychological 
operations in particular as part of a comprehensive military effort.  
Sun Zi emphasized that if possible, one should attempt to disrupt alliances as part 
of defeating the enemy’s strategy without actually battling them.48  Having as part of a 
military strategy the use of the media and international legal regimes in particular to 
shape perceptions or weaken the legitimacy of an enemy position vis-à-vis within the 
United Nations for example seems consistent with this idea.  Much like ancient Chinese 
strategists, “three warfares” also appears to be a non-warfare method to achieve the 
strategic ends sought by coordinating political and diplomatic measures in an offensive 
manner “to psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue them.”49 
Sun Zi also recommended that strategists study and adhere to the morally 
influential factors that lead to harmony between the people and their leadership.50  
Lessons like these inform “the relationship of war to the state and the army to the Chinese 
people [as] fundamental precepts adopted by Mao which live on today in the PLA’s ever-
adaptable understanding of [Mao’s] ‘people’s war.’”51   
Later, Mao Zedong in developing his own body of strategic thought and guidance 
“adopted many of Sun Zi’s principles and applied them to the conditions China faced in 
the mid-twentieth century.”52  But most importantly it was the emphasis that Mao placed 
on political or ideological matters over purely hard military means that is especially 
relevant and informative when explaining the traditional logic behind the “three 
warfares” concept. 
In December 1929, during the Ninth CCP Congress of the Red Fourth Army, Mao 
warned of “many kinds of non-proletarian ideas in the party [that exert] an extremely 
                                                 
47  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 93. 
48  Ibid., 93. 
49  Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, xxxvii. 
50  Sun Zi, Sawyer and Sawyer, The Art of War, 167. 
51  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 92. 
52  Ibid., 94. 
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power influence and constitute a great obstacle to the implementation of the party’s 
correct line.”53  Mao was specifically targeting what he considered to be the emergence 
of a “purely military viewpoint” that neglected political matters, which he considered to 
have primacy. 
Mao stated that those with a “purely military viewpoint” regarded “military 
affairs and political work as opposed to each other, and fail to recognize military work as 
only one of the tools to accomplish the political tasks.”54  Mao further stated that “some 
even declare: ‘When military work is well done, political work is naturally done well; 
when military work is not well done, political work cannot be well done either.’  This is 
to go one step farther and regard military work as leading political work.”55 
Some of Mao’s military leaders and strategists believed that the army’s task was 
to simply fight.  But Mao pointed out that these commanders failed: 
…to recognize the fact that the Red Army [was] an armed force for 
carrying out the political tasks of the class.  In its work, especially in 
China today, the Red Army definitely does not exist merely for the sake of 
fighting.  Besides fighting, it must also shoulder such important tasks as 
agitating, organizing, arming and helping the masses, and building 
political power.  The Red Army does not fight merely for the purpose of 
fighting.  It fights in order to agitate, organize, arm and help the masses 
and build political power.  Apart from such objectives, fighting loses its 
meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.56 
Most importantly when considering “three warfares,” Mao warned his 
commanders and strategists of overlooking “the importance of the propaganda team in 
propaganda work.”57  
 
                                                 
53  Tse-tung Mao and United States. Joint Publications Research Service, Collected Works of Mao 
Tse-Tung (1917–1949) (Arlington, Va; Springfield, Va: Joint Publications Research Service; for sale by the 
National Technical Information Service, 1978), 165. 
54  Ibid., 166. 
55  Ibid., 166. 
56  Ibid., 166. 
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The Chinese leadership and the PLA have acknowledged many times in the past 
their hard power weaknesses relative to other nations, especially the Soviet Union and the 
United States. This has often resulted in Chinese strategies that sought to use more 
indirect methods. Zhu De, a former Chinese military leader, has stated “The kind of war 
to fight depends on what kind of arms we have.”58  
During the period of improved Sino-U.S. relations between 1972-1989, the 
Chinese believed “that disseminating and popularizing a view of the Soviet Union as 
economically weak, socially divided, and beset with ethnic difficulties [would] encourage 
increased resistance to Soviet efforts to expand its influence. [By creating and fostering 
this perception, especially in the minds of American strategists, Chinese policymakers 
saw] the ultimate target [of these efforts as being] more the emotions than the rational 
calculations of the Soviet leaders.”59  In this case, an approach that sought to 
psychologically agitate the Soviet leadership seemed to have utility in the minds of 
Chinese strategists.  Essentially, the Chinese sought to “agitate the Soviets in a variety of 
ways designed to upset them emotionally.”60  The Chinese strategic approach was to 
repeatedly provoke Soviet emotions by agitating with “exquisite control.”61   
In must be noted that, “unlike many militaries the PLA unfortunately does not 
publish a National Military Strategy document explicitly outlining its warfighting 
[concepts].”62 However, reading many of the publications intended for senior officers 
that have emerged from the National Defense University in Beijing and other similar 
institutions proves helpful in piecing together different elements of PLA warfighting 
concepts and theories.63 
Michael Pillsbury’s Chinese Views of Future Warfare however contains a number 
of insightful essays by PLA officials written during the 1990s.  The writings from this 
                                                 
58 This is quote is contained in David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, 
Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 60. 
59  Pillsbury, Strategic Acupuncture, 57–58. 
60  Ibid., 54. 
61  Ibid., 54. 
62  Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 59. 
63  Ibid., 59. 
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period in particular are especially important because they grant the reader insight into 
how Chinese military leaders at that time perceived a changing strategic environment in 
which the PRC found itself immediately after the end of the Cold War.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that they also largely drove the logic and thinking behind what eventually 
emerged in the form of the 2003 CMC order directing the development of the “three 
warfares.”  
Many of these essays discuss the importance of information and its role in conflict 
with many of the Chinese authors advocating its advantageous usage in combat as an 
essential part of a comprehensive national effort.  In “Weapons of the 21st Century,” 
Chang Mengxiong, who served during this period on the Committee of Science, 
Technology and industry of the System Engineering Institute, states that “information–
intensified combat methods are like Chinese boxer[s] with a knowledge of vital body 
points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement.”64 
Information is also considered a key element by many Chinese military strategists 
due to its importance in helping change an inferior strategic position into a superior one.  
Pillsbury’s compendium includes an important essay by Shen Kuiguan, a former 
professor at the PLAAF Command Institute in Beijing.  Shen argues that “the law of 
conversion from superiority to inferiority or vice versa is an important principle of 
military dialectics.”65  This law, according to Colonel Shen, “is composed of superior 
political conditions, powerful military forces, abundant material base, full war 
preparations, correct operational directions, advantageous natural conditions, favorable 
mass opinion and international support, among which some factors occupy a dominant 
position.”66  Conversely, “unfavorable mass opinion and lack of international support” 
can lead to an inferior or “disadvantageous position.”67 Shen concludes that “the real 
 
 
                                                 
64  Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1997), 253. 
65  Ibid., 214. 
66  Ibid., 215.  Italics added here for emphasis. 
67  Ibid., 215. 
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cause for the victory of one side and the defeat of the other” includes “the comprehensive 
superiority founded on many war factors particularly the political nature and the 
subjective direction of the war.”68 
Colonel Shen’s views suggest that the PLA sees utility in the “three warfares” in 
that they serve to complement physical isolation on the battlefield by isolating an enemy 
in the cognitive dimension as well. He cites the 1991 Gulf War as a key example in that 
Iraq was in an “isolated position” with respect to international public opinion and that 
efforts to “strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the whole operational system” of 
warfare would help prevent the PRC from being in a similar disadvantageous position in 
a future conflict.69 
Major General Wang Pufeng, a former Director of the Strategy Department in the 
Academy of Military Science in Beijing, wrote in 1995 that the Chinese military “must 
strive for an active approach in a reactive situation and use every means possible to 
destroy the opponent’s information superiority and transform our inferior position in 
information.”70  He suggested further that efforts to deceive an opponent would be 
beneficial to “muddle the opponents perceptions and inspire false assessments” and that 
“before and after war, information hassling never stops for a moment.”71  
The aforementioned Analysis of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare, first published in 
2004 and later in 2006, offered up a moral to Case 18—”Using Tricks Legitimately”—to 
remind the PLA student and practitioner of “three warfares” that Sun Zi placed great 
emphasis on deception and provides an additional link between the old and the new 
regarding Chinese strategic thought.  It states that: 
to subdue the enemy, [the PLA needs] to rely on strategies and maneuvers, 
or deceptions and ruses.  Effective usage of ruses has also been 
extensively employed in various wars in the modern times.  Also, as long 
as wars or military conflicts exist, the principle of ‘war is a game of 
deception’ will not lost its viability.  We need to learn to master and 
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69  Ibid., 216–217. 
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employ the principle of ruses in the law of war to detect the enemy’s tricks 
timely, expose the ruses of the enemy which are in violation of the ruse 
rules, and adopt flexibly various types of effective and legitimate ruses to 
deceive and defeat the enemy.72 
It is clear that the Warring States period, the example of the Qin state, Sun Zi, and 
early Maoist and more recent PLA thought all serve as important traditional and 
conceptual Chinese examples that undergird the basic rationale for “three warfares.”  
However, there are also Western examples that are equally as informative and that also 
stress the importance of information with respect to perception and morale. 
Many classic Western military works on strategy emphasize similar factors and 
serve as further theoretical foundations for “three warfares.”  For example, Clausewitz 
stressed in his classic work On War that the state, its military, and its population—what 
he referred to as a “paradoxical trinity”—are the most essential factors when considering 
and developing grand strategy.73  Clausewitz believed in particular that a state’s 
“passions [needed to be] kindled in war” in order to provide the moral justification for the 
state and military to be successful in achieving the strategic ends sought.74  Appealing to 
the will, seeking the support, and sustaining the morale of a state’s populace while 
attacking those of an opponent becomes equally relevant to purely military matters (e.g., 
relative force numbers).    
Antoine Jomini’s The Art of War also placed emphasis on morale, but more in 
terms of the military in particular.75 Jomini states, “the first means of encouraging the 
military spirit is to invest the army with all possible social and public consideration.”76  
Emphasizing the importance of strengthening the collective psyche of one’s own forces, 
and its leaders in particular, Jomini is clear in stating that it is “particularly important that 
this spirit should pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable 
                                                 
72  Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1997). 
73  von Clausewitz, Howard and Paret, On War, 89. 
74  Ibid., 89. 
75  Antoine Henri de Jomini and Charles Messenger, The Art of War (London; Novato, Calif: 
Greenhill Books; Presidio Press, 1992), 410. 
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and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.”77  Essentially, the national 
psyche (i.e., Clausewitz) and military’s morale (i.e., Jomini) must both be strengthened 
and protected.  This strongly suggests that attacking the national psyche and morale of 
one’s enemy should be pursued in order to achieve the military and greater political aims 
desired. 
B.H. Liddel Hart has stated that “whatever the form, the effect to be sought is the 
dislocation of the opponent’s mind and dispositions.”  In his book Strategy, Hart analyzes 
twenty-five centuries of warfare and comes to the conclusion that the morale of one’s 
enemy is a viable target and that propaganda has utility when seeking what he felt was a 
more advantageous indirect approach, as opposed to a direct one.  Hart points out a quote 
by Lenin who stated “the soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle and the 
soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the 
delivery of a decisive blow practicable.”78  Hart also defined proper strategy as “the art of 
distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” while suggesting a 
“wider variety of military means” to achieve what are ultimately political objectives 
sought through warfare.79 
When considering the aforementioned examples, there are clearly aspects of both 
Chinese and Western strategic thought that serve as theoretical inspiration for a PLA 
“three warfares” concept. But these are not sufficient alone in explaining the “three 
warfares” and its influences.   
There are equally important modern Western thoughts and views on the 
importance of information in war in general and U.S. information operations doctrine and 
experiences in particular that serve as powerful inspirations for the PLA in their pursuit 
of a “three warfares” concept and an associated doctrine.  It is to these that we now turn. 
                                                 
77 Antoine Henri de Jomini and Charles Messenger, The Art of War (London; Novato, Calif: Greenhill 
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IV. SIMILARITIES TO AND INFLUENCES OF U.S. 
INFORMATION WARFARE AND OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
For much of the later half of the twentieth century, many military theorists have 
come to recognize that advances in computers, communications, weapons, and guidance 
technologies would revolutionize warfare.80  Thoughts and predictions regarding what 
were once futuristic concepts of warfare came to manifest themselves in conflicts during 
the 1990s and 2000s.  U.S. military actions during these periods particularly showcased 
how warfare has evolved. Further, as a result of these conflicts, the U.S. military formally 
began to codify its thinking on how information should be treated in war. 
Additionally, the study of warfare and associated military reforms undertaken by 
the PLA, while reflecting those aspects of both Chinese and Western strategic traditions 
discussed thus far, have greatly involved “the [consideration of] wars of other nations” as 
well.81 This seems reasonable considering that the last major combat operation that the 
PLA has undertaken was China’s “punitive” attack on Vietnam” in 1979 when Mao’s 
“people’s war” at that time had been modified to include “modern conditions.”82  While 
this military adventure served as an important impetus for PLA modernization afterword, 
“China lost a great deal in the 1979 war, whether the balance sheet is measured in lives or 
political cost.  But perhaps the greatest loss was in a more intangible product—China’s 
reputation.”83 
But while the PLA has learned from both classic studies of war and its own 
experiences, Chinese military officials and strategists have also studied modern 
campaigns to assist in developing their own operational doctrine.84  Over time, “the 
mainstays of PLA operations and deployments [have been] subjected to doctrinal reform” 
                                                 
80 Quote from Gary Pounder, "Opportunity Lost," Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 2 (Summer, 
2000), 59.; Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 
1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 302. 
81  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 92. 
82  Gerald Segal, Defending China (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 223, 226. 
83  Ibid., 227. 
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and modern U.S. military campaigns have served as a critical catalyst for such reforms.85  
This was especially so during the 1990s in the wake of the U.S.-led Gulf War and 
NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia.86  
Prior to the U.S. war with Iraq in 1991, there were many, not only in the PLA, 
who “pre-supposed that the war in the Gulf would be a typical industrial-era war.”87  But 
in the end, the Gulf War had “a jarring effect on the PLA” after dire Chinese predictions 
regarding U.S. prospects for success prior to the conflict ultimately proved incorrect 
while “remind[ing] the PLA High Command of its deficiencies” in many areas, 
especially information warfare.88  
Information warfare and its associated operations were thought by some in the 
PLA to have played “a significant role in the U.S. victory.”89  PLA Major General Wang 
Pufeng, who some refer to as the “father of Chinese IW,” has stated that the 1991 conflict 
against Iraq was the archetype of information war.90 Later, toward the end of the decade, 
the U.S. military provided the PLA with further examples on how a modern military 
attempts to manage, control, and guide information, particularly that which is public, 
during a conflict. 
U.S. military missions in Iraq in 1991 and the former Yugoslavia in 1999, along 
with recent U.S. military activity in both Afghanistan and Iraq, have been highly 
influential in the development of U.S. military information warfare doctrine. When 
considering “three warfares,” what has been especially critical is the impact on the PLA, 
which has given much thought and attention to these conflicts in general and U.S. 
methods involving information operations in particular.91  
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As David Shambaugh has noted, “Over the past three decades, reforming doctrine 
has been a catalyst for a vast range of PLA reforms [which seek to reconfigure]…the 
force structure…military education…training regimens…research and 
development…and [PLA] operational strategy.”92  Shambaugh also believes that the PLA 
looks to other modern militaries, mostly that of the United States, for ideas and 
inspiration.  According to him, “One can clearly see the lessons learned by the PLA from 
foreign conflicts and the resulting changes in doctrine as applied to military exercises and 
force structure [of PLA training] in recent years.”93  
Regarding information warfare and operations in particular, the 1991 Gulf War 
has provided an example for the PLA of how information can be used and shaped to 
better legitimize military action.  For example, President George H.W. Bush’s “effective 
mobilization of United Nations support was accompanied by propaganda suggesting that 
the United States, rather than acting in it s own interest, was merely doing the UN’s 
bidding.  The strategic purpose of this [perception management] campaign was to isolate 
Iraq diplomatically” which proved highly successful.94  Additionally, at the operational 
level the U.S. military employed a number of psychological operations methods (e.g., 
pamphlets, broadcasts) in order to weaken Iraqi military morale and cast doubt into the 
minds of those opposing U.S. and coalition forces as to the legitimacy of their cause. 
Later, the 1999 U.S.–led NATO military campaign in Yugoslavia, dubbed 
Operation Noble Anvil by the Americans, proved to be perhaps “the first true ‘media 
war,’ in which the power of instantaneous coverage and dramatic visual images rendered 
strategic importance to a handful of tactical events,” highlighting the influential power 
that public information, especially television coverage, could have on public opinion.95  
In preparing for the bombing campaign against the Serbs, the United States military and 
other NATO members developed a comprehensive IO campaign plan and organized 
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IO cells that were tasked with integrating and employing “such diverse tools as civil 
affairs, electronic warfare, intelligence, and public information in an effort to control and 
dominate the ‘information battle space.’”96 
This was the U.S. military’s “first major test for IO doctrine and organization” 
and Operation Noble Anvil in particular showed how “media preoccupation” of events 
greatly affected how the NATO mission was both militarily and morally judged by the 
public.97  This conflict continued to underscore that “in an era of relentless, real-time 
coverage, the media has an indelible impact on public opinion, long identified as a critical 
center of gravity for any U.S. military campaigning.”98  Further, the U.S. military 
continued to realize that public affairs in particular and “through its public information 
mission,” could “clearly supply some of the capital required for winning the media war 
(as part of the IO campaign) and [could] bolster public support for the overall military 
effort.”99  
The conflict in the Balkans also caused U.S. military commanders to respond “to 
manipulation of the media by Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian political leaders.”100  For 
example: 
The Serbs used government-controlled media to target only Serb citizens 
with its distorted messages (rather than the international community).  
Government leaders sowed fear and paranoia in Bosnian-Serbs, who in 
turn developed a violent hatred of Bosnian and Croat ethnics within 
Yugoslavia, further convincing the Serbs that they were indeed struggling 
for their survival as a people.101 
Both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Noble Anvil have given observers 
insight into those aspects of information warfare and operations that are proven to work.  
But in addition to these more explicit examples that primarily incorporated information 
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operations at the operational level of war, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has in 
the past sought to develop its own deliberate strategic level perception management 
capabilities.102  And these examples are perhaps the strongest impetus for the PLA “three 
warfares,” given their strategic focus. 
For example, “Perception Management: Iran,” developed during the 1979 hostage 
incident deliberately targeted those closest to Ayatollah Khomeini in order to influence 
the Iranian leader.103  Later during 1980s, the Reagan Administration continued similar 
perception management efforts at the DoD and subordinate service and combatant 
command levels.  Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense at the time, recommended 
that the United States should “employ sophisticated strategic deception operations” as 
part of military competition with the Soviet Union.104  
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward reported that a “secret plan, adopted at 
a White House meeting [targeting Libya] was outlined in a three-page memo that John 
M. Poindexter, the president's national security affairs adviser, sent to President 
Reagan.”105  A key aspect of this information shaping strategy was to combine “‘real and 
illusionary events—through a disinformation program—with the basic goal of making 
Gadhafi think…that there [was] a high degree of internal opposition to him within Libya, 
that his key trusted aides [were] disloyal, that the U.S. [was] about to move against him 
militarily.’”106  Woodward further reported that this plan included “‘a series of closely 
coordinated events involving covert, diplomatic, military and public actions,’ according 
to Poindexter's memo.”107 
A year before the official 2003 CMC “three warfares” directive, The New York 
Times reported in 2002 that “the Pentagon [was] developing plans to provide news items, 
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possibly even false ones, to foreign media organizations as part of a new effort to 
influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly 
countries.”108   While acknowledging that the U.S. military has a long history of waging 
information warfare against America’s enemies, the Times report described U.S. military-
led efforts to create the Office of Strategic Influence that would serve to “broaden [the 
perception management] mission into allied nations in the Middle East, Asia and even 
Western Europe…a role traditionally led by civilian agencies, mainly the State 
Department.”109   
This “small but well-financed Pentagon office…established shortly after the Sept. 
11 terrorist attacks, was a response to concerns in the administration that the United 
States was losing public support overseas for its war on terrorism, particularly in Islamic 
countries.”110  The U.S. military sought to “counter the pronouncements of the Taliban, 
Osama bin Laden and their supporters” by apparently hiring former advertising 
executives to manage a “public diplomacy office” along with creating “ a public 
information ‘war room’ to coordinate the [Bush Administration's] daily message 
domestically and abroad.”111 
The Office of Strategic Influence effort attempted to coordinate several DoD tools 
in attempting to shape the perceptions of foreign audiences.  For example, “one of the 
office's proposals [called] for planting news items with foreign media organizations 
through outside concerns that might not have obvious ties to the Pentagon.”112 Other 
designs involved “sending journalists, civic leaders and foreign leaders e-mail messages 
that promote American views or attack unfriendly governments” along with 
“psychological activities and deception” that would utilize “the instruments and staff of 
the military's globe-spanning public affairs apparatus” and would include “scientific 
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polling and focus groups” to determine effectiveness.113  Then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers described these U.S. military efforts as a “strategic 
influence campaign” that would include both psychological operations and public 
affairs.114  
Many of these examples, especially U.S. efforts to develop the Office of Strategic 
Influence, show that the United States has continuously sought to develop and 
demonstrate its desire to manage perceptions of how others, its enemies in particular, 
view and process its actions. Current PLA efforts to develop the “three warfares” seem 
highly comparable to these past U.S. examples, serving as powerful influences on 
Chinese military doctrinal development.  In fact, the purposes of the Office of Strategic 
Influence seem quite analogous to what is generally understood about PLA media, legal, 
and psychological warfare aspirations.  
After witnessing how the United States military has incorporated its information 
operations (IO) into past campaigns, it seems that the PLA is attempting to mirror U.S. 
doctrine by developing its own information operations (IO) (i.e., “three warfares”) but 
with Chinese characteristics. There seems to be no doubt that the PLA views information 
warfare (IW) and its associated operations as something “similar to what is known as a 
‘force multiplier’ in the U.S. military: ‘A capability that, when added to and employed by 
a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus 
enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.’”115 It is within these 
three realms—media, legal, and psychological—where informational and ideational 
conflict is to be waged between the PLA and its enemies.  
Understanding that “one of the problems in analyzing PLA IW strategy…is 
disaggregating it from translations or outright copying of U.S. doctrinal writings,” there 
is an increased difficulty in discerning the true design and intent of associated PLA 
doctrine.116 For example, the PLA has “often selectively lift[ed] verbatim text from U.S. 
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military operational guides such as Information Operations (FM 100–6) and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare Operations, and 
Joint Vision 2010.”117  It seems apparent that “protection of intellectual property rights is 
not a priority in PLA writings on [information warfare].118 
Additionally, PLA general Su Enze’s assertion that information warfare includes 
“electronic warfare, tactic deception, strategic deterrence, propaganda warfare, 
psychological warfare, [and] computer warfare” is “virtually identical to the U.S. Air 
Force’s doctrinal ‘Six Pillars of Information Warfare.’”119 Examples like these, along 
with the apparent impact that U.S. military actions throughout the last twenty years, 
strongly suggest that current U.S. information warfare and operations doctrine are an 
influence on PLA IO doctrine. 
Therefore it is also reasonable to assume that there is a strong guiding influence 
from U.S. IO doctrine on the PLA “three warfares” concept.  While perhaps not the sole 
influence, U.S. IO doctrine and theory is certainly a major component to PLA thought 
that drives its own doctrinal evolution. And it seems worthwhile to briefly highlight some 
important aspect of U.S. information operations doctrine to see how they relate and 
inform the PLA “three warfares” doctrinal concept. 
U.S. military doctrine defines a unit and its commander’s operational environment 
as a physical area that includes “factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) 
and the information environment.  Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and 
neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation.”120  Most importantly, the 
information environment is considered to be “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, 
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”  The U.S. 
military’s idea of an information environment is quite similar to Habermas’s concept of a 
public sphere, and includes leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations 
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among the actors that reside within this environment.121  Essentially, it is an environment 
“where humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, 
and is therefore the principal environment of decision making.”122   
U.S. doctrine divides the information environment further into three main 
interrelated dimensions.  The first is the physical dimension “where the information 
environment overlaps with the physical world.”123  This is the “supporting infrastructure 
that enable[s] individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the air, land, 
sea, and space domains.”124  The second is the informational dimension “where 
information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected.”125  
Third, and most critical to gaining a better concept and understanding of the PLA “three 
warfares”, is the cognitive dimension within the information environment.  The cognitive 
dimension is best described as: 
… encompass[ing] the mind of the decision maker and the target audience 
(TA).  This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, 
and decide.  It is the most important of the three dimensions.  This 
dimension as also affected by a commander’s orders, training, and other 
personal motivations.  Battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive 
dimension.  Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, 
state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well 
as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors 
influence this dimension.126 
The cognitive dimension within an information warfare environment is a place 
where media, legal, and psychological warfare would best be waged by the PLA due to 
the stated fact that it seeks to affect the minds of decision makers and the public at large, 
and involves factors such as morale, perception, and emotion. 
                                                 
121  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy [Faktizität und Geltung.] (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 631. 
122  United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations (Washington, DC: Department of 
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The aforementioned OSD description of media warfare as “aimed at influencing 
domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for 
China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to 
be adverse to China’s interests” fits well within the U.S. description of the cognitive 
dimension.127  So does PLA psychological warfare insofar as it seeks “to undermine an 
enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at 
deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian 
populations.”128  Both are clearly targeting elements within the cognitive dimension as 
described above.   
Even the third component, legal warfare, which seeks to utilize “international and 
domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions 
of China’s military actions,” strongly suggests that the minds of relevant adversary 
decision makers and collective public opinion would be the intended “three warfares” 
targets. U.S. IO doctrine also encourages “laws, regulations, and procedures relevant to 
information and decision making” as key “[c]ognitive properties of the [i]nformation 
[e]nvironment.”129  Clausewitz would agree, given that decision makers and the 
collective opinion of the people constitute two out of the three poles in his trinity.  
Additionally, both affect and bestow legitimacy, either domestically or internationally 
along the cognitive dimension.130  
U.S. IO doctrine states that there are five core IO capabilities – psychological 
operations, military deception, combat camera, public affairs, civil-military operations, 
and defense support to public diplomacy.131  Psychological operations are “planned 
operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of 
                                                 
127  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2010, 26. 
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129  United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, III–2–III–3. 
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Republic of China 2010, 26. 
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their government, organizations, groups, and individuals.”132  Military deception is 
defined as “those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as 
to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary 
to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 
friendly forces’ mission.”133  The mission of combat camera activities is to provide U.S. 
military officials at all levels “with an imagery capability in support of operation and 
planning requirements across the range of military operations” by developing and 
disseminating “products that support strategic and operational [information operations] 
objectives.134  Public affairs activities are defined as “those public information, command 
information, and community relations activities directed toward both external and 
internal audiences with interest in [the Department of Defense].”135  Civil-military 
operations are those activities that help to “establish, maintain, influence, or exploit 
relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 
organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace.”136 And finally, defense support 
to public diplomacy seeks to “facilitate the diplomacy efforts of the [U.S. Government]” 
by promoting U.S. Government policy abroad by influencing “foreign audiences and 
opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and 
institutions and their counterparts.”137 
While not exactly alike, U.S. and Chinese IO concepts appear to be generally 
congruent.   If one were to combine the associated activities of U.S. psychological 
operations, military deception, combat camera, and public affairs as defined by U.S. 
doctrine above, both PLA media and psychological activities and intended goals would 
indeed seem analogous.   
The GPD has begun to incorporate “three warfares” into PLA joint training 
among the different branches by developing “publicity campaigns using the modern 
                                                 
132  United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, II–1. 
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electronic media to mobilize the Chinese population and demoralize the enemy,” 
employing “propaganda leaflets and loudspeakers on the battlefield to encourage 
defections or surrender,” and emphasizing the need for PLA forces to “minimize civilian 
casualties [in order] to avoid collateral damage to cultural treasure [and] respect the laws 
of war [vis-à-vis the] treatment of prisoners and non-combatants.”138  The PLA Analysis 
of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare stresses that: 
It is necessary to increase the accuracy of training and education in the 
laws of war for the Chinese military, improving the alertness and 
battlefield identification and handling capabilities of officers and soldiers, 
effectively guarding against the perfidious behavior of the enemy, 
ensuring that future military struggles of the Chinese military will not be 
exploited or used by the enemy, satisfactorily completing the operational 
tasks assigned by the [Chinese Communist Party] Central Committee and 
the Central Military Commission.139   
As with U.S. IO, “the goal of the ‘three warfares’ is to seize the political initiative 
and contribute to the success of military campaigns.”140 
However, there is a key difference between PLA “three warfares” and U.S. 
information operations. U.S. IO doctrine clearly states that:  
[Information operations] may involve complex legal and policy issues 
requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval. The 
United States constitution, U.S. laws, and international law set boundaries 
and establish precedence for military activity in the information 
environment.  Another country’s legal basis and limitations for military 
activity in the information environment may differ.  U.S. military 
activities in the information environment, as in the physical domains, are 
conducted as a matter of law and policy.  U.S. forces, whether operating 
physically from bases or locations overseas or virtually in the information 
environment from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, are 
required by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the [law 
of armed conflict].141 
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There is no evidence to support or suggest the idea that such legal barriers or constraints 
limit PLA IO in general, and the “three warfares” in particular.   
The United States and other Western militaries have demonstrated their desire to 
affect their enemies in the cognitive dimension.  During the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 
U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign against the Serbs, and even during the most recent 
U.S. military action against Libya, perception management in the form of information 
operations has proven to have utility as an aspect of waging modern war at the 
operational and tactical levels.142  
At the strategic level, the United States has sought to develop a comprehensive 
perception management capability most exemplified by U.S. Defense Department efforts 
to develop an Office of Strategic Influence. The PLA has indeed learned from these 
examples, as well as from evolving U.S. IO doctrine.   
If U.S. political and military officials continue to recognize the benefits and utility 
of IO capacities within the cognitive dimension that have the potential to affect adversary 
decision makers, and given the influence that the United States military has had on the 
PLA in the past, it would seem quite reasonable to infer that the same can be said about 
Chinese views regarding the utility of its IO designs. 
In summary, it seems quite clear that the cognitive dimension is where the PLA 
“three warfares” is to be employed.  By influencing perceptions with PLA narratives 
injected within the public sphere, media warfare seeks to influence key domestic and 
international decision-making. PLA psychological warfare, much like its U.S. equivalent 
would simply seek to target an enemy’s morale and emotions to degrade its fighting 
abilities.   
And much like past U.S. efforts, PLA legal warfare would favorably interpret 
applicable and relevant laws and regulations within the cognitive dimension of the public 
sphere to build legal legitimacy.  All “three warfares” components are quite consistent 
with U.S. doctrinal equivalents.   
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But quite unlike its U.S. IO counterpart, PLA “three warfares” most likely have 
no legal constraints or operational restrictions in attempting to shape and manage 
perceptions.   Essentially, the “three warfares” is unbounded in that sense. 
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V. PLA SOFT POWER ASPIRATIONS IN THE COGNITIVE 
DIMENSION 
PLA modernization programs continue to focus on developing parsimonious, 
complementary, and synergistic capabilities that will grant the PRC the ability to achieve 
quick, decisive, and favorable resolution of regional conflicts involving land, sea, air, and 
the informational offensive and defensive realms. If successful, efforts like these will 
certainly constitute hard power gains for the PRC.  However, as part of its broader 
national strategic goal of increasing what it calls “comprehensive national power” (CNP) 
or zōnghé guólì, Beijing also seeks to cultivate greater attractiveness as well.143   This 
was an idea perhaps devised early in 1980s that “stemmed from Chinese traditional 
military philosophy” developed during the Warring States era.144   
According to David Lampton in The Three Faces of Chinese Power – Might, 
Money, And Minds, CNP is “the sum total of coercive, economic, and ideational power of 
a nation.”145  Additionally, the idea of CNP “shapes the way Chinese understand their 
national circumstance and strategy” and “resonates with the thinking of traditional 
strategists such as [Sun Zi].”146  It is the inclusion of “ideational power,” or what Joseph 
Nye terms “soft power,” with hard power elements (i.e., military, economic) that is most 
intriguing and obvious when considering the “three warfares” concept.147 
In his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Nye 
elucidates his concept by describing what soft power is and is not.148  With soft power 
resources like cultural attraction, information, or diplomatic appeal “a country may obtain 
the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, 
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emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow 
it.”149   This is essentially a concept based in values and ideals. 
Specifically, soft power is a more indirect or ideationally persuasive way for a 
country to get what is desired and is in stark contrast to a state’s use of “hard” power, 
which includes material means like military or economic factors, to coerce and influence 
others. Instead, a nation’s soft power “co-opts people rather than coerces them” by 
attracting and seducing others to get them to want what you want without the sole use of 
hard power carrots and sticks.150   Many officials within the Chinese government have 
increasingly realized that soft power has utility and that mass communications must be 
used to nurture and grow China’s soft power to counter what has been a Western 
dominated narrative.  
On a number of occasions, both Chinese leaders and state run media have often 
mentioned the importance of soft power development as a complementary part of China’s 
comprehensive national power.  For example, in 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated 
that China must “promote vigorous development and prosperity of socialist culture” and 
that “to improve China’s ‘soft power’ is a paramount state mission.”151  Additionally, 
Xinhua News Agency has reported on “how the need to develop China’s soft power has 
emerged as a hot topic at the annual session of China’s parliament and [within] top 
political” bodies.152 
People’s Daily, as well, has “proclaimed that China has to substantially increase 
its soft power in order to play an active role in international competition.”153 This widely 
circulated government newspaper takes the view that “we cannot be soft on ‘soft power’” 
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and makes clear that “culture is a key integral part of a country’s overall national 
strength, what people have called ‘soft power’, and it has become a point of competitions 
between national power.”154  
Taking perhaps a more Hobbesian view, some Chinese officials see this struggle 
in the global public sphere as just another dimension of conflict. Li Shulei, the CCP 
congressional delegate from the Central Party School has stated that “…some powerful 
foreign nations wish to use culture as a weapon against other nations, and for this reason 
we must work hard to raise our country’s ‘soft power.’”155  And Li Changchun, the 
current propaganda and ideology coordinator for the CCP Standing Committee, suggests 
that Chinese media organizations, or “cultural organizations,” should become what he 
calls “aircraft carriers” (i.e., powerful Chinese conglomerates) that are “equipped to do 
battle with foreign media groups like [Rupert Murdoch’s] News Corp.”156  Clearly, these 
are highly influential Chinese policy makers who see Western domination of mass 
communications as a threat to be countered. 
But while enjoying the ability to censor the news media domestically, the Chinese 
government has very little control over the global public sphere and has had to create and 
communicate a more sophisticated and appealing message.  To accomplish this, Chinese 
officials have increasingly realized that to be more effective, the Chinese media must 
“upgrade [their] persuasion methods.”157  
But China is also being helped by the fact that the Western dominated narrative 
has actually waned in its ability to monopolize the global public sphere.  While new 
communications technologies have resulted in lowered barriers to entry and an increase 
in competition, “Western mass communication is losing influence in the developing 
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world.”158   Whereas the BBC World Service “has been a reliable and respected voice in 
distant lands,” media outlets like Al Jazeera, which is popular in the Middle East, are now 
viable media alternatives for non-Western cultural tastes and preferences.  China seeks to 
provide similar alternatives. 
Beijing has increased the budgets of many of its mass communications entities 
like China Central Television (CCTV), which has developed CCTV 9, a satellite news 
channel that targets and is specifically tailored to foreign markets.   This furthers the 
reach of Beijing’s version of events by providing 24-hour international news in English, 
Spanish, French, with Russian and Arabic forthcoming. In light of a post-Cold War 
retreat by Western powers in using mass communications public diplomacy to enhance 
their soft power, China now sees an opportunity to fill this vacuum.  With increased 
investments like these, the PRC hopes to “outspend America hugely in coming years.”159  
In the 1990s, China acknowledged that its hard (i.e., military and economic) 
power lagged far behind other more developed countries, especially the United States, 
and that when it did decide to wield what military force it had (e.g., during the 1995–
1996 Taiwan Straits crisis), public views toward China became more negative and thus 
counter-productive.160  Conversely, in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
China’s decision to not lower the value of its currency earned it appreciation and praise 
throughout much of South East Asia in particular.  
American journalist Joshua Kurlantzick argues that this incident caused Chinese 
leaders to better appreciate the use of soft power to persuade instead, rather than seeking 
to coerce through the sole use of hard power means.161  Kurlantzick states that China’s 
“growing attractiveness is conveyed through various means, including culture, 
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diplomacy, participation in multinational organizations, businesses’ actions abroad, and 
the gravitational pull of China’s economic strength.”162  
Beginning with United Nations recognition in 1971, China has become 
increasingly integrated into the international order in an economic, diplomatic, and 
informational sense.  While this growing interconnectedness has proven extremely 
beneficial, it has also placed constraints on China’s leaders.  If Chinese leaders decided to 
take military action against Taiwan in an effort to achieve unification for example, they 
must not only consider domestic factors such as public support for such an action, but 
must now also seriously consider international reactions as well.   
For example, Chinese officials understand that negative international economic or 
diplomatic reactions in particular could potentially endanger China’s continued rise.  
PRC leaders now recognize that for any PLA military action to be complementary to 
continued national development and greater CNP gains, securing both favorable domestic 
and relative international agreement is critical.  For the CCP, this is a very difficult 
balance between domestic and international public opinion.163  
While the PLA certainly seeks to increase its hard military power, it also desires 
complementary capabilities that enhance soft power.  Therefore, PLA political cadres in 
particular are especially desirous of achieving a perception management and soft power 
capability through media, legal, and psychological efforts that shapes and protects not 
only domestic perspectives but enhances China’s international image as well.  As past 
U.S. military actions and current U.S. IO doctrine have illustrated, these methods have 
utility and complement hard military capabilities.  GPD “three warfares” “are envisioned 
as being integrated not only into military campaigns but also into China’s larger national 
strategy employing all forms of power, including political, diplomatic, social, and 
economic means.”164 
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In his essay “Future Military Trends,” Gao Heng links “every field related to 
comprehensive national power” together to prepare for what he refers to as “war in 
depth.”165  It seems reasonable to include areas associated with the “three warfares”—
public opinion, legal means, and morale—under CNP.  Media, legal, and psychological 
warfare, to be effective, must be able to reach into and affect an enemy even within its 
own borders, deep within the enemy’s cognitive dimension. 
An article in 2007 in Jiefangjun Bao, the daily newspaper of the General Political 
Department of the PLA, stated the following regarding the military’s adoption of soft 
power and its utility as a hard power complement: 
While hard power is visible and violent, soft power is invisible and mild. 
Because of this, in modern times, power ought to be perceived as an 
integration of hard and soft powers, a mutual complementation of hard and 
soft powers, as well as a win-win outcome jointly secured by hard and soft 
powers. In the final analysis, the concept of “soft power” refers to the 
concept of “grand power.” As hard power usually finds expression in 
weapons and equipment, the armed forces must come up with redoubled 
efforts in developing weapons and equipment. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that in modern times, weapons and equipment contain both “hard” 
and “soft” ingredients. Military software has not only secured the normal 
operation of weapons and equipment but also expanded and upgraded the 
functions of weapons and equipment or even “remade” weapons and 
equipment.166 
Dennis Blasko states the following regarding CNP and its relationship with warfare: 
While overt military strength is important, other aspects of national power 
are also essential to waging war.  In modern China, calculations of [CNP], 
including factors such as political, economic, geographic, scientific and 
technological conditions, as well as military might, are commonly used to 
judge the relative power of nations and inform national decision-makers.  
In fact, for Sun Zi, political, diplomatic, and economic means are 
preferred methods to achieve victory.167 
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In this context, it is reasonable to infer that Chinese strategists view the “three 
warfares” as a militarized variant that fits within a strategy in pursuit of greater national 
CNP. Further, this is perhaps why the PLA, as opposed Western views, considers 
informational conflict in particular more broad and inclusive and not solely confined to 
conflict involving purely military forces.168 
Recent Chinese thought regarding information warfare makes a point in 
establishing what some Chinese military officials consider an important relationship 
between military and social science.  According to a former president of China’s 
Academy of Military Science, “it is imperative to have not only wide basic knowledge of 
military science but also a rich knowledge of politics, economics, and history from the 
social sciences” that can be used for military purposes.169 
Pillsbury states, “the ‘spiritual (including psychological) and intellect power soft 
factors’ that ‘determine the effectiveness of the material form (hard) national power’ 
include politics, foreign affairs, and culture and education.”170  He states further that: 
The contents of CNP and the roles of these factors have changed 
throughout history and will continue to do so in the future; therefore, new 
aspects may be added or dropped when evaluating different time periods.  
Today, the rapidly increasing significance of information as a source of 
power is a case of a new factor of growing importance.  [Many Chinese 
strategists believe] in the current world, because of the development of 
new means of communication, different types of information about market 
trends can be promptly delivered to various places in the world, therefore, 
as a facet, in international relations the role of information power is 
growing and can be compared with political and economic factors.171 
As part of their pursuit of national ideational or soft power, some Chinese leaders 
are determined to “break the U.S. and Western media monopoly.”172  Much like “PRC 
diplomats [who] are becoming more adept at using the mass media,” similarly the PLA 
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must do the same.173  This would seem consistent with the public perception or media 
warfare subcomponent of “three warfares” in particular and how it suggests informational 
combat between non-state entities (i.e., media sources) in order to positively influence 
populations, either domestic or international. 
Given the influence that U.S. military operations and doctrine have on PLA 
concepts of modern warfare, together with those set by the “U.S. military’s successful use 
of [information operations] during the two Iraq wars [and] the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan,” along with Nye’s concept of soft power, some PLA authors now mention 
“military soft power” as something to be developed.174 
PLA attempts to insert favorable media narratives into both the domestic and 
global public spheres could serve to strengthen and bolster support for Chinese military 
actions or endeavors.175 Media actions such as Beijing’s periodic release of defense white 
papers to the international community or publishing articles in prominent journals can be 
viewed as a persistent efforts to manage or shape public perceptions of China’s military 
modernization or is overall rise as a great power.176  Further, in pursing its “three 
warfares,” the PLA has sought to highlight through media reporting its humanitarian and 
peacekeeping efforts.   
Shaping and inserting narratives like these into a more global and networked 
public sphere seems useful if Beijing desires to appeal to “Chinese civilians who want to 
see their military…engaged in socially beneficial functions and their country taking an 
active role as a responsible member of the international community.”177  Further, media 
                                                 
173  Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds, 128. 
174  Alison Kaufman and James Bellacqua, How to make Friends, Influence People, and Win Wars - 
Examining PLA Views of "Military Soft Power" (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis 
Corp.,[2008]), www.opensource.gov (accessed March 2011). 
175  China Media Project, "The Three Closenesses 三贴近," Journalism & Media Studies Centre, The 
University of Hong Kong, http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/03/20/212/ (accessed Sep 11, 2010).; Steven Livingston, 
Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention 
(Cambridge, Mass: Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, 1997), 18. 
176  Zheng Bijian, "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005), 
18.; Edward Wong Ansfield, "China Lays Out a Vision for its Military in 'Volatile' Times: [Foreign Desk]," 
New York Times 2011. 
177  Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 180. 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
 
 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
 
41 
efforts like these are also critical to China’s international relations given that “many 
outsiders continue to level moral condemnation and opprobrium toward the PLA for its 
role at Tiananmen.”178  The PLA is highly aware that “foreign perceptions of [its actions] 
have an impact both on its operational capabilities…and the way the PLA interacts with 
professional militaries of other countries.”179 
Both prior to and during any future conflict, PLA leadership would also hope to 
gain and maintain legal justification especially through self-serving interpretations of 
international law and regulations for any PRC military action to be effective and 
considered domestically and internationally legitimate.  Apparently fearing a similar 
negative international backlash like that experienced by the United States after its 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 for example, Chinese officials have sought preemptively to 
“legislate [their] own legal riposte to [Taiwanese independence].”180  Beijing also seeks 
the ability to use multilateral organizations “to reassure other nations [and] to constrain 
the big powers acting in the region” as a complement to its “coercive measures.”181  
While it seems that the legal warfare component of “three warfares” cannot be 
solely confined to PLA activities in that they involve more diplomatic or political 
activities than purely military ones, national or whole-of-government efforts like these 
certainly nest well within PLA military efforts in that they serve to “legitimize Chinese 
policies while undercutting the authority or justification of enemy actions.”182   
Lastly, purely psychological efforts that target an enemy’s morale while 
bolstering the morale of PLA forces and the greater Chinese population would be 
beneficial. That said psychological warfare methods are now routinely included in many 
PLA training exercises.183 
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But while the “three warfares” certainly is intended to be used offensively, it also 
seems reasonable to conclude that there is also a defense aim as well.  This is simply due 
to the fact that the “three warfares” is a GPD responsibility and is consistent with PLA 
tradition.   
The purpose of GPD “political [and ideological] training [has always been] to 
disseminate official party and military guidance, promote good morale [(c.f. Clausewitz, 
Jomini)], and ensure discipline among the troops.”184  This is especially so given the 
current context in which China finds itself.  Those responsible for China’s internal 
security and military morale consider information and its use as especially essential in 
stopping “potential internal disturbances [within the cognitive dimension] to prevent 
opponents from utilizing them.  The symptoms of disturbance must be found and stopped 
as soon as possible.  In case disturbances break out, we should gather a dominant power 
to suppress them rapidly.  And if they are difficult to suppress, we must contain their 
sphere of influence.”185  Much like the PLA has been used in the past to provide order 
and stability during times of crisis (i.e., Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen uprising), the 
GPD undoubtedly sees the “three warfares” as another important way by which domestic 
stability can also be achieved along with other material methods albeit in the cognitive 
dimension.   
Defensive control or shaping of information according to some PLA officers 
could perhaps be useful in keeping “effective control over military elements [by 
introducing important thoughts and views, and military actions concerning foreign 
affairs.”186  After the 1989 Tiananmen uprising, views like these became more popular 
within the PLA in the 1990s and provide further rationale and purpose for PLA “three 
warfares” activities. 
In today’s information age, the exchange of ideas within a global public sphere 
faces increasing competition.  This is an increasingly noisy, fast paced, and expanding 
public arena where the ideas and messages of many diverse formal and informal 
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collectivities simultaneously seek communicative power through increasingly diverse 
forms of powerfully persuasive media.187  This is also an environment where a 24-hour 
international news cycle and real-time reporting give mass media the ability to shape 
political discourse and public opinion which can also be referred to as the “CNN 
effect.”188 Many national and military leaders in particular have had to come to grips with 
this phenomenon because of its influence on popular attitudes toward state activities, 
especially military engagements.189  China’s leaders and PLA officials are no different. 
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This thesis has argued three very basic points. First, the foundation of the PLA 
“three warfares” concept has roots in certain aspects of both Chinese and Western 
strategic thought and tradition.  Second, the PLA desire to develop its “three warfares” 
concept is informed and strongly influenced by Western thoughts and views on the 
importance of information in war in general and U.S. information operations doctrine and 
experiences in particular.  And finally, the PLA sees utility in achieving its “three 
warfares” aims, both as a complement to its warfighting capabilities and also as a 
militarized soft power component that nests within a larger Chinese national strategy. 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) through its 2003 official pronouncement 
tasked the GPD with developing a mostly strategic media, legal, and psychological 
warfare capability in order to improve political and ideological work.  However, many of 
the available descriptions of the “three warfares” are quite simple, less than insightful, 
and fall short of providing any real substance or rationale for such an idea. 
China’s history and its strategic traditions serve as an influential sources for 
strategic behavior and development.   The Warring States period (463–222 BCE) is an 
especially important historical example and is particularly relevant in that it has provided 
Chinese strategists with a number of important lessons.   The Qin state in particular was 
considered by its neighboring states to be weak and of little threat in what was a 
multipolar competitive power struggle.  However, the Qin was able to employ strategy 
and tactics that adroitly employed psychological methods such as propaganda, which 
resulted in victory over its more powerful neighbors. In the minds of many modern 
Chinese intellectuals, the Warring States era is quite analogous to the world in which the 
PRC found itself after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Qin state in particular serves as 
a positive example for those Chinese strategists that acknowledge PRC weakness vis-à-
vis the United States in general, and PLA weakness in particular.  Warring States era 
works like Sun Zi’s The Art of War remain an integral part of PLA professional military 
education and emphasize deception, the disruption of hostile alliances, and the effective  
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manipulation of information and enemy perceptions in war. Sun Zi also recommended 
that strategists study and adhere to the morally influential factors that lead to harmony 
between the people and their leadership.   
Later, Mao Zedong developed his own body of strategic thought and guidance 
that placed heavy emphasis on political or ideological matters over purely hard military 
means.  Mao specifically targeted what he considered to be the emergence of a “purely 
military viewpoint” that neglected political matters, which he considered to have 
primacy. Most importantly, Mao warned his commanders and strategists of overlooking 
the importance of propaganda. 
The Chinese leadership and the PLA have acknowledged many times in the past 
their hard power weaknesses relative to other nations, especially the Soviet Union and the 
United States. This has often resulted in Chinese strategies that sought to use more 
indirect methods.  
Military thought during the 1990s placed emphasis on the importance of 
information and its role in conflict with many of the Chinese authors advocating its 
advantageous usage in combat as an essential part of a comprehensive national effort.  
Information was viewed as being important in helping change an inferior strategic 
position into a superior one. Specifically, unfavorable mass opinion and lack of 
international support were to be avoided and could lead to a less than advantageous 
position for China.  
The Warring States period, the example of the Qin state, Sun Zi, and early Maoist 
and more recent PLA thought all serve as important traditional and conceptual Chinese 
examples that undergird the basic rationale for “three warfares.”  But there are also 
Western examples that are equally as informative and that also stress the importance of 
information with respect to perception and morale. 
Clausewitz stressed that the state, its military, and its population are the most 
essential factors when considering and developing grand strategy. Appealing to the will, 
seeking the support, and sustaining the morale of a state’s populace while attacking that 
of an opponent becomes equally relevant to purely military matters (e.g., relative force 
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numbers).  Antoine Jomini emphasized the importance of strengthening the collective 
psyche of one’s own forces, and its leaders in particular. Both strongly suggests that 
attacking the national psyche and morale of one’s enemy should be pursued in order to 
achieve the military and greater political aims desired. 
Hart stressed that morale of one’s enemy is a viable target and that propaganda 
has utility when seeking what he felt was a more advantageous indirect approach, as 
opposed to a direct one.  Hart also advocated for a strategy that employed a wide variety 
of military means to achieve the political ends sought by warfare. 
There are clearly aspects of both Chinese and Western strategic thought that serve 
as theoretical inspiration for a PLA “three warfares” concept. But these are not sufficient 
alone in explaining the “three warfares” and its influences.   
Western views on the importance of information in war in general and U.S. 
information operations doctrine and experiences in particular that serve as powerful 
inspirations for the PLA in their pursuit of a “three warfares” concept and an associated 
doctrine. U.S. military actions during the 1990s and 2000s showcased how warfare 
continues to evolve. Further, as a result of these conflicts, the U.S. military began to 
formally codify its thinking on how information should be treated in war.   
While the PLA has looked to classic Chinese studies of warfare along with its 
own experiences, Chinese military officials and strategists have also studied modern 
conflicts in order to develop its own doctrinal concepts. Modern U.S. military campaigns 
have served as a critical catalyst for such reforms.  
The United States and other Western militaries have demonstrated their desire to 
affect their enemies in the cognitive dimension.  During the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 
U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign against the Serbs, and even during the most recent 
U.S. military action against Libya perception management in the form of information 
operations has proven to have utility as an aspect of waging modern war. At the strategic 
level, the United States has also sought to develop a comprehensive perception 
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management capability most exemplified by U.S. Defense Department efforts to develop 
an Office of Strategic Influence. The PLA has indeed learned from these examples, as 
well as from evolving U.S. IO doctrine.   
If U.S. political and military officials continue to recognize the benefits and utility 
of IO capacities within the cognitive dimension that have the potential to affect adversary 
decision makers, and given the influence that the United States military has had on the 
PLA in the past, it would seem quite reasonable to conclude that the same can be said 
about Chinese views regarding the utility of its IO designs.  Therefore, it is clear that the 
cognitive dimension is where the PLA “three warfares” is to be employed.   
By influencing perceptions with PLA narratives injected within the public sphere, 
media warfare seeks to influence key domestic and international decision-making. PLA 
psychological warfare, much like its U.S. equivalent would simply seek to target an 
enemy’s morale and emotions to degrade its fighting abilities.  And much like past U.S. 
efforts, PLA legal warfare would favorably interpret applicable and relevant laws and 
regulations within the cognitive dimension of the public sphere to build legal legitimacy.  
All “three warfares” components are quite consistent with U.S. doctrinal equivalents.    
However, quite unlike its U.S. IO counterpart, PLA “three warfares” apparently has no 
legal constraints or operational restrictions in attempting to shape and manage 
perceptions.  
PLA modernization programs continue to focus on developing parsimonious, 
complementary, and synergistic capabilities that will grant the PRC the ability to achieve 
quick, decisive, and favorable resolution of regional conflicts involving land, sea, air, and 
the informational offensive and defensive realms. As part of its broader national strategic 
goal of increasing CNP, Beijing also seeks to cultivate greater attractiveness as well.  
Many Chinese leaders have increasingly realized that soft power has utility and 
that mass communications must be used to nurture and grow China’s soft power to 
counter what has been a Western dominated narrative.  Chinese leaders and state run 
media have often mentioned the importance of soft power development as a 
complementary part of China’s comprehensive national power.  
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Chinese officials see this struggle in the global public sphere as just another 
dimension of conflict and many highly influential Chinese policy makers see Western 
domination of mass communications as a threat to be countered.  But while enjoying the 
ability to censor the news media domestically, the Chinese government has very little 
control over the global public sphere. 
If Chinese leaders were to take military action against Taiwan in an effort to 
achieve unification for example, they must not only consider domestic factors such as 
public support for such an action, but must now also seriously consider international 
reactions as well.  Chinese officials understand that any negative international economic 
or diplomatic reactions in particular could potentially endanger China’s continued rise.  
PRC officials, and the CMC in particular, now recognize that for any PLA military action 
to be complementary to continued national development and greater CNP gains, securing 
both favorable domestic and relative international agreement is critical.  
While the PLA certainly seeks to increase its hard military power it also desires 
complementary capabilities that enhance soft power.  Therefore, PLA political cadres in 
particular are especially desirous of achieving a perception management and soft power 
capability through media, legal, and psychological efforts that shapes and protects not 
only domestic perspectives but enhances China’s international image as well.  As past 
U.S. military actions and current U.S. IO doctrine have illustrated, these methods have 
utility and complement hard military capabilities. PLA media, legal, and psychological 
warfare, to be effective, must be able to reach into and affect an enemy even within its 
own borders, deep within the enemy’s cognitive dimension. 
Additionally, it is reasonable to consider that Chinese strategists view the “three 
warfares” as perhaps a militarized variant that fits within a greater national CNP pursuit 
strategy.  
Given the influence that U.S. military operations and doctrine have on PLA 
concepts of modern warfare, the U.S. military’s successful use of [information 
operations] during its conflicts, and Nye’s concept of soft power, some PLA authors now 
refer to a “military soft power” as something to be developed. 
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But while the “three warfares” is certainly intended to be used offensively, it also 
seems reasonable to conclude that there is also a defensive aim as well.  This is simply 
due to the fact that the “three warfares” is a GPD responsibility and is consistent with 
PLA tradition.  Defensive control or shaping of information according to some PLA 
officers could perhaps be useful in keeping control over the Chinese military over 
military elements.   
In today’s information age the exchange of ideas within a global public sphere 
faces increasing competition.  This is an increasingly noisy and fast paced broadened 
public arena where the ideas and messages of many diverse formal and informal 
collectivities simultaneously seek communicative power through increasingly diverse 
forms of powerfully persuasive media. And many national and military leaders in 
particular have had to come to grips with this phenomenon because of its influence on 
popular attitudes toward state activities, especially military engagements. China’s leaders 
and PLA officials are no different and, as a result, all involved see enormous benefit to be 
gained from further development of the “three warfares.” 
While this thesis serves to fill a gap in existing literature on this particular aspect 
of PLA modernization by offering a more comprehensive understanding and explanation 
of the “three warfares,” its origins, and its intended aims as a complement to PLA war 
fighting doctrine, further research would certainly benefit by exploring the ability of the 
PLA to develop the “three warfares”, its potential effectiveness and prospects for success, 
and those constraining and limiting factors that could possibly inhibit its efforts. 
At this point in understanding the “three warfares,” it seems reasonable to 
conclude that any adequate response to Beijing’s media, legal, and psychological 
warfares requires at least a like, or optimally, a greater degree of believability, 
legitimacy, and soft power attractiveness in order to ultimately provide the necessary 
support for effective IO activities that can compete with the PLA along the cognitive 
dimension.  
Additionally, any potential PLA opponent, the United States military included, 
would be wise to first observe how effective the “three warfares” actually is.  For now, 
this seem difficult given that PLA media, legal, or psychological warfare is an unknown 
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entity in terms of its actual effectiveness, and it is questionable as to whether the “three 
warfares” has ever been deployed or actually tested against an adversary.  
But quite unlike the PLA, the U.S. military has put into practice its own IO 
activities along the cognitive dimension as shown here.  That having been said, the U.S. 
military would be wise to continue to develop and refine its own IO doctrine and 
practices further.  
However, like Beijing, Washington must work to ensure that it also has a 
comprehensive national IO perception management capability that is part of and supports 
a larger national strategy.  This would greatly benefit and enhance the resonance within 
the global public sphere of those IO activities conducted and associated narratives 
promulgated at lower levels within the U.S. military and would increase the likelihood 
that they will be coherent, consistent, and nested within such a strategy. 
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